The study of military history is a vital component of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) as a complement to the study of Joint Doctrine. The Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (JMOHC) illustrates principles of Joint Doctrine and Joint Force Employment through historical and modern example of U.S. Joint Force Operations.
Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War is recognized dogmatically as a definitive text with regard to the study of National Strategy and Policy, international relations, and political science. In addition to being the first true military historian, many regard Thucydides as the father of the study of International Relations, and the first writer in the intellectual tradition of Realism. This paper proposes that Thucydides history of the 27 year long Peloponnesian War is not only important to Strategic level of military studies, but is equally applicable to the military studies at the Operational level of war. Thucydides history is the first account of complex Joint Military Operations (JMO) in a major conflict between the joint forces (land and sea) of multi-national coalitions fighting in multiple theaters (sometimes simultaneously) across multiple domains. This paper will demonstrate that the fundamentals of Joint Force Employment were clearly validated in the Peloponnesian War as the outcome at key decisive points (Major Operations) was ultimately determined by superior (or inferior) operational execution when examined within the frameworks of the Principles of War and Center of Gravity at the Operational level.
Finally, this paper will draw conclusions as to which principles of Joint Force Employment were the most determinant in the Peloponnesian War and draw lessons learned based upon these conclusions as to the enduring importance of the Principles of War and Operational Art for Joint Force Planning and Joint Force Employment in the modern era.
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