Gap Crossings: Not Just a Tactical Problem - Operational Art in U.S. Army Doctrine, Case Studies of River Crossing Success and Failure in World War II, Rapido River in Italy, Irrawaddy in Burma

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, the goal of this unique book is to determine how U.S. Army corps and divisions ensure deliberate gap crossings, a type of combined arms operation, are planned using operational art. Examination of doctrine for gap crossings shows gap crossings to be tactical problems. Corps, division, and operational art doctrine does not directly address the need to incorporate gap crossings as part of an overall campaign.

This paper compares two case studies from World War II in their strategic context with tactical outcomes using operational art. The failed crossing of the Rapido River in Italy and the successful crossing of the Irrawaddy in Burma are the two historical case studies examined. Operational art considered for each campaign shows the importance of the planners' and commanders' understanding and communication of not only the tactical requirements of a gap crossing but also how the crossing is part of the larger operation to achieve the strategic goats.
Current gap crossing doctrine is tactically focused and should remain tactically focused. This monograph determined operational planners and commanders at the division and corps must understand operational art and incorporate it into the planning of a gap crossing like any other tactical action to facilitate the success of a campaign.

Introduction * Organization * Gap Crossing Literature * Development of U.S. Army Gap Crossing Doctrine * Gap Crossing Studies * Operational Art in U.S. Army Doctrine * Case Studies * Case Study 1: A River Crossing Failure * Case Study 2: A River Crossing Success * Conclusion * BIBLIOGRAPHY

Although recent conflicts have placed emphasis on the counterinsurgency fight, potential conflicts still may include combined arms gap crossings. Gap crossings by American forces under direct fire of the enemy have not been done since Vietnam, and the last combined arms crossing during an operation was in 1995 against only nature as an enemy. Over the last century the U.S. Army has undergone several changes in river crossing techniques and equipment, engineer force structure, and gap crossing doctrine. The tactical requirements of a gap crossing are well documented but with the completion of modularity, U.S. Army corps and divisions have significantly fewer engineers and thus river crossing assets. Does the reduced force structure still have the ability to conduct a deliberate gap crossing in accordance with the latest doctrine? The last deliberate gap crossing, a type of combined arms operation, conducted at the division level was before modularity. More importantly the current update to gap crossing doctrine FM 3-90,12 Combined Arms Gap Crossing Operations is tactically focused and does not incorporate the operational art of FM 3-0 Operations.

The focus of this thesis is to determine how U.S. Army divisions ensure deliberate gap crossings, a type of combined arms operation, are planned using operational art. The current gap crossing doctrine is tactically focused; it will be up to the commander and the operational planners to incorporate operational art to conduct a successful gap crossing to facilitate the success of the campaign. The analysis of historical case studies in their strategic context with tactical outcomes using the definition of operational art to compare each will show the importance of the planners' and commanders' understanding of not only the tactical requirements of a gap crossing but tying the crossing to a larger operation to achieve the strategic goals. The current gap crossing doctrine is tactically focused; it will be up to the operational planners and commanders at the division to incorporate operational art to conduct a successful gap crossing to facilitate the success of the campaign.

Dettagli