Learning from the Past: Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis - Maskirovka Denial and Deception, Developing a Cover Story, Operation ANADYR, Getting the Cubans on Board, Disingenuous Diplomacy

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this report examines the use by the Soviets of denial and deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moscow's surreptitious dispatch of nuclear-capable SS-4 and SS-5 surface-to-surface missiles to Cuba in 1962 upset the strategic balance in an alarming way. The resulting showdownwhich the Russians call the "Caribbean Crisis" and the Cubans call the "October Crisis" brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. From its inception, the Soviet missile operation entailed elaborate denial and deception (D&D) efforts. The craft of denying the United States information on the deployment of the missiles and deceiving US policymakers about the Soviet Union's intent was the foundation of Nikita Khrushchev's audacious Cuban venture. Piecing together the deception activities from declassified US, Russian, and Cuban accounts yields insights that can help us anticipate and overcome the D&D efforts of a growing number of foreign adversaries today.

Moscow has always had a flair for D&D, known in Russian as maskirovka. its central tenet is to prevent an adversary from discovering Russian intentions by deceiving him about the nature, scope, and timing of an operation. Maskirovka covers a broad range of concepts, from deception at the strategic planning level to camouflage at the troop level. Russian military texts indicate that maskirovka is treated as an operational art to be polished by professors of military science and officers who specialize in this area.
DIA analysis preceding the missile crisis noted that the Soviet Army had probably employed large-scale battlefield deception "more frequently and with more consistent success than any other army.'" The Soviets practiced extensive maskirovka before their move into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moscow also trained foreign forces to apply deception, including North Vietnamese units before the Tet offensive in 1968 and Egyptian forces before crossing the Suez Canal in 1973.

Dettagli