Mondadori Store

Trova Mondadori Store

Benvenuto
Accedi o registrati

lista preferiti

Per utilizzare la funzione prodotti desiderati devi accedere o registrarti

Vai al carrello
 prodotti nel carrello

Totale  articoli

0,00 € IVA Inclusa

Prezzo online:
17,57
20,63
-15 %
20,63

Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on 'contracts as reference points'. Including a contingency of the form, 'The buyer will require a good in event E', has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract is strictly superior to a contingent contract. If parties have different views about the division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be superior if including a contingency would lead to divergent reference points.

Dettagli down

Generi Economia Diritto e Lavoro » Economia » Economia, altri titoli » Economia del lavoro, occupazione e disoccupazione

Editore Cambridge University Press

Formato Ebook con Adobe DRM

Pubblicato 23/05/2024

Lingua Inglese

EAN-13 9781009396097

0 recensioni dei lettori  media voto 0  su  5

Scrivi una recensione per "More is Less"

More is Less
 

Accedi o Registrati  per aggiungere una recensione

usa questo box per dare una valutazione all'articolo: leggi le linee guida
torna su Torna in cima