Only in the Mind of the Enemy: Can Deterrence Effectiveness be Measured? Military Deception, Historical Cases, Japan World War II, Cuban Missile Crisis, Libya, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The concept of deterrence is as old as war, but determining if deterrence activities and messages are having the desired effect on the adversary decision maker is challenging since the adversary will not readily admit to being deterred. Developing deterrence measures of effectiveness is imperative to determine if deterrence activities and messages are meeting the deterrence strategy objectives and achieving the desired end states. However, determining why something did not occur is difficult to assess. This paper proposes that planners can use intelligence indicators to provide feedback for measuring deterrence effectiveness. Reviewing the evolution of U.S. deterrence strategy, as well as, current U.S. deterrence strategy provides planners with the desired end states and principles for executing deterrence operations. It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the current general deterrence strategies because specific adversary decision makers are not targeted. A search for joint deterrence doctrine disclosed that such doctrine does not exist. In the absence of deterrence doctrine, this paper reviewed four historical cases. The cases highlighted the relationships between the United States and Japan prior to and during World War II, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Libya from 1981 to 2003 and Iraq prior to Gulf War I. These cases demonstrate that a multitude of indicators showed deterrence activity effects, yet the United States did not always adjust its deterrence strategy to successfully influence the adversary decision maker. A review of military deception doctrine and historical deception operations provides insight into what is required to influence and deter an adversary decision maker. Using the military deception operations lessons learned combined with four historical case observations, this paper proposes an indicator list that planners can use to develop appropriate priority intelligence requirements (PIR). The PIRs will provide planners with the feedback required to assess the effectiveness of deterrence strategy.

CHAPTER 1 * DEFINING THE TERMS * Deterrence * Communicating Deterrence Strategy * Deterrence Measures of Effectiveness * CHAPTER 2 * DETERRENCE DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY * Deterrence Doctrine * Deterrence Strategy Evolution * Current Deterrence Strategy * CHAPTER 3 * HISTORICAL CASES * Japan 1941 - 1945 * Cuban Missile Crisis * Libya 1981 - 2003 * Iraq 1990 - 1991 * General Supporting Activities * CHAPTER 4 * MILITARY DECEPTION OPERATIONS * Military Deception Planning * Deception Operations * Military Deception Operations Lessons Learned * Application to Deterrence Operations * CHAPTER 5 * MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS * Deterrence Theory Studies * Historical Indicators * Deterrence Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) * CHAPTER 6 * RECOMMENDATIONS * CONCLUSION * APPENDIX 1 * FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS * LIST OF ACRONYMS USED * BIBLIOGRAPHY

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