Task Force Stryker Network-Centric Operations in Afghanistan: Case Study of Real-World Application in War, Network Components, Echeloning Command Posts, Tactical Decisionmaking

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this book presents a case study examining the real-world application of the network-centric warfare concept during combat operations in Afghanistan. Network-centric warfare "broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive Warfighting advantage." A great deal has been made of the asymmetric advantage of terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas. In a networked environment with properly trained leaders, soldiers, and units, such advantages are fictional.

Network-centric organizations are supposed to increase their combat power by doing a better job of synchronizing events and their consequences; achieving greater speed of command; and increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness of the formation. These capabilities can be a reality in today's operating environment. The main problem with network-centric operations is that there remains a great deal of skepticism among counterinsurgency pundits and others about the concept and the technology necessary to operate in such a fully networked environment.

Task Force Stryker operations in Afghanistan (2009-2010) demonstrate a reality contrary to conventional wisdom. The reality is that network-centric operations are relevant and effective in the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains of warfare.3 Of course, these domains often merge, and it is important to order activities in a way that capitalizes on overlapping capability. For example, the attacks of enemy personnel and their subsequent detention by Afghan National Security Forces described in the vignettes in this paper are obviously in the physical domain. An intersection of domains, however, happens when the movement of forces and positioning of command posts in the physical domain enhances how the cognitive domain informs tactical decisionmaking. The combination of information technology (IT) and sensors creates an extraordinary level of situation awareness and understanding and is obviously in the information domain. However, technology alone is not enough; leaders must properly organize the technology in time and space, which occurs in the physical domain. Furthermore, people must be organized around the technology in ways to improve collaboration, which intersects with the social domain.

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