The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles - Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, Presidential Decision Directives, COIN and the Army

The contemporary challenges underpinning interagency cooperation within the U.S. Government are not entirely new. For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services all those involved in providing for the common defensehave struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. This new century's post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), international system and security environment have placed additional strains on the U.S. Government's interagency processes.

U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.

While the present volume represents a significant effort towards addressing the current interagency problems, much more discussion is required. The baseline goals of this partnership effort between the Bush School and the Strategic Studies Institute are to generate knowledgeable interaction and chart a way forward for government, private sector, and academic actors to reexamine interagency reform as a precondition for achieving real change. Such an initiative could not be more relevant or time sensitive.
Chapter I * Issues and Challenges in Support and Stability Operations * 1. Challenges in Support and Stability Operations: Why Each One is Different * 2. Presidential Decision Directive-56: A Glass Half Full * 3. A "Peace Corps with Guns": Can the Military Be a Tool of Development? * Chapter II * Case Studies and Field Experiences * 4. The Perils of Planning: Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq * 5. U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 2003-2006: Obstacles to Interagency Cooperation * 6. The Interagency Process in Reconstruction of Post-World War II Japan * 7. An Alternative View: Sri Lanka's Experience with an Enduring Insurgency * Chapter III * Learning, Innovation, and New Initiatives * 8. The Exquisite Problem of Victory: Measuring Success in Unconventional Operations * 9. The Failure of Incrementalism: Interagency Coordination Challenges and Responses * 10. Interagency Reform: An Idea Whose Time Has Come * 11. Strategic Communication: Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation * Chapter IV * Leadership, Education, Training, and Development for Interagency Operations * 12. Bridging the Gap: Integrating Civilian-Military Capabilities in Security and Reconstruction Operations * 13. Training, Education, and Leader Development for the National Security Interagency * 14. Leadership Education and Training for the Interagency * 15. The Influence of Stability Operations on the Army Profession and Public Management * 16. Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Bottom-up Review * 17. What Is to Be Done?: Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations * Glossary * Bibliography * About the Contributors

Dettagli